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OPINION OF THE COURT  




In 1997, the United States Postal Inspection Service and the Pennsylvania 
State Attorney General's Office conducted a 
joint undercover child pornography investigation. On March 6, 1997, Ray 
Donald Loy wrote a letter to Postal Inspector 
Thomas Kochman in response to an advertisement placed in a sexually 
explicit magazine by Special Agent Dave Guzy of 
the Attorney General's Office. In that letter, Loy indicated that he and 
his wife had a "good collection" of child 
pornography and he expressed an interest in trading tapes with Kochman. 
Loy stated that if Kochman was serious about 
trading, Kochman should call Loy so they could discuss it over the 
telephone.  
 
On March 17, 1997, Inspector Kochman monitored and recorded a call placed 
by Special Agent Guzy to Loy. During 
that conversation, Loy gave detailed descriptions of some of the tapes in 
his collection and told the agent that he could 
"put together" tapes for trading. He also indicated that he trades with 
many people and offered to give Guzy their names. 
In addition, Loy described how he had produced videos by hiding a 
camcorder in his bag and filming up the skirts of 
young girls as they rode the escalators at a mall.  
 
During the March 17 telephone conversation, Loy specified that he was 
interested in receiving material from the 
undercover agent involving girls ranging from eight to thirteen years of 
age. He specifically requested that Guzy send him a 
tape of girls between the ages of eight and ten in a bathtub ("Bath Time 
video"), which the agent agreed to do.  
 
On April 28, 1997, Inspector Kochman received a letter from Loy bearing 
the return address of R. Loy, P.O. Box 114, 
Langeloth, Pennsylvania 15054, requesting again that the agent send him 
the Bath Time video. In exchange, Loy offered 
to send a video of twelve and thirteen year old children engaged in 
sexually explicit conduct.  
 
Postal Inspector Thomas Clinton determined that the post office box Loy 
used as his return address had, in fact, been 
opened by Loy. The application for the box listed Loy's address as 204 
Charles Street, Langeloth, Pennsylvania 15054. 
On May 5, 1997, Inspector Clinton prepared a package containing the Bath 
Time video for delivery to Loy's P.O. Box 
and, the same day, submitted an affidavit and application for an 
anticipatory search warrant for Loy's residence at 204 
Charles Street. The application requested authorization to seize evidence 
of violations of Title 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2), 
receipt of child pornography, and 2252(a)(4)(B), possession of child 
pornography. The evidence to be seized included: 
videotapes depicting child pornography, video equipment for viewing, 
producing, and reproducing child pornography, and 
lists of individuals with whom Loy traded. The application conditioned the 
search on Loy accepting delivery of the Bath 
Time tape and returning to his residence with the tape in his possession. 
Chief United States Magistrate Judge Kenneth J. 
Benson issued the anticipatory warrant requested by Inspector Clinton.  
 
On May 6, 1997, Clinton delivered the package containing the tape to Loy's 
post office box in Langeloth, Pennsylvania 
and observed Loy accept delivery of the package. Other agents maintained 
surveillance of Loy as he left the post office 
and returned home with the tape. Loy was observed entering his residence 
with the package in his possession. Inspector 
Clinton then executed the search warrant, seizing from Loy's residence the 
Bath Time videotape as well as another tape 
depicting child pornography, fifteen computer disks containing child 
pornography, fifty videocassettes, several 
pornographic magazines, a VCR player and television set, as well as 
various letters describing Loy's solicitation of child 
pornography and his offers to trade such materials.  
 
On May 2, 1998, a grand jury returned a two-count Indictment against Loy. 
The first count of the Indictment charged 
Loy with knowingly receiving child pornography through the United States 
mail in violation of 18 U.S.C.  
§2252(a)(2). The second count charged him with knowingly possessing three 
or more items, containing visual depictions 
produced using materials transported in interstate and foreign commerce, 
the production of which involved the use of 
minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
2252(a)(4)(B).  
 
Loy moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home, alleging that the 
search warrant was not supported by 
probable cause. A suppression hearing was held before the district court 
on August 13, 1998. The district court denied 
Loy's motion, finding that the warrant was supported by probable cause and 
that even if the warrant was invalid, the 
evidence need not be suppressed because the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule applied. On September 3, 
1998, Loy entered an unconditional plea of guilty to Count One of the 
Indictment and a conditional guilty plea to Count 
Two. Loy's conditional plea preserved his right to appeal whether the 
search warrant was supported by probable cause 
and whether the officers reasonably relied on the warrant in good faith. 
On December 3, 1998 the district court sentenced 
Loy to a thirty- three month term of imprisonment followed by three years 
of supervised release. Additionally, the district 
court imposed special conditions of supervised release requiring Loy to 
undergo testing and treatment for drugs and 
alcohol, prohibiting him from having unsupervised contact with minors, and 
forbidding him from possessing pornography 
of any type. Loy objected to these conditions on the grounds that they 
were not supported by the record and violated his 
fundamental rights.  
 
On appeal, Loy raises three arguments. First, Loy argues that the district 
court erred in failing to suppress the evidence 
obtained from his home pursuant to the anticipatory search warrant. 
Second, Loy contends that the search warrant issued 
by the magistrate judge did not describe the items to be seized with 
sufficient particularity since the overbroad language in 
the warrant could lead to the mistaken seizure of material protected by 
the First Amendment. The final argument made by 
Loy on appeal is that the district court abused its discretion in imposing 
the special conditions of supervised release.  
 
DISCUSSION  
I. Validity of the Warrant  
 
A. Constitutionality of Anticipatory Search Warrants  
 
As an initial matter, appellant urges this Court to rule that anticipatory 
warrants are per se unconstitutional. The 
constitutionality of anticipatory warrants, i.e. warrants that become 
effective upon the happening of a future event, is a 
question of first impression in this Circuit. However, we recognize that 
every circuit court of appeals to have addressed 
this question has held that anticipatory search warrants are not 
categorically unconstitutional. See, e.g., United States v. 
Hugoboom, 112 F.3d 1081, 1085- 86 (10th Cir.1997); United States v. 
Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir.1993); 
United States v. Tagbering, 985 F.2d 946, 950 (8th Cir.1993); United 
States v. Wylie, 919 F.2d 969, 974 (5th 
Cir.1990); United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 703 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 943, 110 S.Ct. 348, 107 
L.Ed.2d 336 (1989); United States v. Goodwin, 854 F.2d 33, 36 (4th 
Cir.1988); United States v. Goff, 681 F.2d 1238, 
1240 (9th Cir.1982); United States v. Lowe, 575 F.2d 1193, 1194 (6th Cir.) 
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 869 (1978); United 
States ex rel. Beal v. Skaff, 418 F.2d 430, 432-33 (7th Cir.1969).1 Such 
warrants have repeatedly been upheld where 
they are supported by probable cause and the conditions precedent to the 
search are clearly set forth in the warrant or 
supporting affidavit. Hugoboom, 112 F.3d at 1085 (citing cases). We agree 
with the other circuits that "the simple fact 
that a warrant is 'anticipatory' ... does not invalidate a warrant or make 
it somehow suspect or legally disfavored." United 
States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 965 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 
1051, 115 S.Ct. 654, 130 L.Ed.2d 558 (1994); 
Hugoboom, 112 F.3d at 1085 (quoting Gendron, 18 F.3d. at 965). We hold, 
therefore, that anticipatory warrants which 
meet the probable cause requirement and specifically identify the 
triggering event are not per se unconstitutional.  
____________________________________________  
1. The only other circuit that has not yet directly addressed this 
question is the Eleventh Circuit. However the Eleventh Circuit has 
indicated in dictum that anticipatory warrants are appropriate when the 
contraband is on a "sure course" to a known destination. United 
States v. Nixon, 918 F.2d 895, 903 n. 6 (11th Cir.1990).  
___________________________________________  
 
B. Probable Cause  
 
Anticipatory warrants differ from traditional warrants in that they are 
not supported by probable cause to believe the items 
to be seized are at the place to be searched when the warrant is issued. 
United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 1201 
(10th Cir.1998). In fact, when issuing an anticipatory warrant, the court 
knows that the contraband has not yet reached 
the place to be searched. Id. That does not mean, however, that 
anticipatory warrants do not have to be supported by 
probable cause. As with all warrants, there must be a sufficient nexus 
between the contraband to be seized and the place 
to be searched before an anticipatory warrant can be issued. Id. (quoting 
United States v. Dennis, 115 F.3d 524, 529 
(7th Cir.1997)).  
 
To satisfy the nexus requirement, it is not enough that the anticipatory 
search warrant be conditioned on the contraband 
arriving at the designated place. While such conditions guarantee that 
there will be probable cause at the time the search is 
conducted, the warrant must also be supported by probable cause at the 
time it is issued. See Rowland, 145 F.3d at 
1202 ("Although the conditions precedent ensure that an anticipatory 
warrant will not be executed prematurely, such 
conditions do not serve as a substitute for the magistrate's probable 
cause determination."); see also United States v. 
Hendricks, 743 F.2d 653, 654-56 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1006, 
105 S.Ct. 1362, 84 L.Ed.2d 382 
(1985)(holding anticipatory search warrant for defendant's home invalid 
where the affidavit provided no assurances that 
defendant would take the contraband home after picking it up at the 
airport, despite the fact that the warrant was 
conditioned on the contraband arriving at defendant's house).  
Consequently, when presented with an application for an 
anticipatory warrant, the magistrate judge cannot rely on police 
assurances that the search will not be conducted until 
probable cause exists. Rowland, 145 F.3d at 1202. Instead, the magistrate 
judge must find, based on facts existing when 
the warrant is issued, that there is probable cause to believe the 
contraband, which is not yet at the place to be searched, 
will be there when the warrant is executed. Id.  
 
Since our review of the district court's decision denying Loy's motion to 
suppress is plenary, United States v. Williams, 3 
F.3d 69, 71 (3d Cir.1993), we must apply the same deferential standard as 
the district court in reviewing the magistrate 
judge's initial probable cause determination. Id. at 71 n. 2 (citing 
United States v. Jones, 994 F.2d 1051 (3d Cir.1993)). 
This deferential standard, however, "does not mean that reviewing courts 
should simply rubber stamp a magistrate's 
conclusions...." United States v. Tehfe, 722 F.2d 1114, 1117 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 904, 104 S.Ct. 1679, 80 
L.Ed.2d 154 (1984). Instead, the duty of a reviewing court is to ensure 
that the magistrate judge had a "substantial basis" 
for concluding that probable cause existed. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213, 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 
(1983).  
 
Where the warrant application indicates that there will be a controlled 
delivery of contraband to the place to be searched, 
the nexus requirement of probable cause is usually satisfied. Rowland, 145 
F.3d at 1202-03. However,  
where as here, the delivery of the contraband is to a place other than the 
one to be searched, namely, Loy's post office 
box, "the warrant application must present additional facts establishing 
[that] the contraband will be taken to the place 
designated for [the] search." Id. at 1203. As explained above, the fact 
that an anticipatory warrant is conditioned on the 
contraband arriving at the place to be searched is insufficient to meet 
the probable cause requirement. Therefore, there 
must have been probable cause at the time the warrant was issued to 
believe that Loy would bring the tape home with him 
after picking it up at the post office.  
 
The only support in the warrant application for the assumption that Loy 
would return home with the videotape was 
Inspector Clinton's statement, "[i]t is anticipated that Ray Loy, upon 
receipt of this package, will return to his  
residence at 204 Charles Street, Langeloth, Pennsylvania 15054 with this 
package in his possession at the time he enters 
his residence." There was no evidence in the affidavit that Loy had 
previously transported child pornography from his 
private post office box to his residence or that he would do so in this 
instance. Nor were there any facts indicating that 
Loy had used his residence in the past for receiving child pornography.2 
Id. at 1204 (finding that the probable cause 
requirement was not met, in part, because the affidavit provided no 
evidence that defendant had transported contraband 
from his post office box to his residence or facts otherwise linking his 
home to the suspected illegal activity).  
_____________________________________  
2. In denying Loy's motion to suppress, the district court found that the 
affidavit illustrated defendant's intent to receive child 
pornography at his home rather than any other location or, the court 
stated, the affidavit, at least, sets forth the defendant's use of his 
home in connection with his illegal activities. The court based this 
finding on the fact that Loy included his home address in some of his 
letters to the undercover agents. We do not believe this finding is 
supported by the record. While Loy did provide his address to the 
agents, he consistently stated that his post office box was the only place 
that the agents could send sexually explicit materials.  
__________________________________________  
 
The government, nevertheless, contends that there was probable cause to 
believe Loy would bring the video home, based 
on the assumption that Loy stored his child pornography at his house. In 
support, the government cites Inspector Clinton's 
statement contained in the affidavit that based on his experience, those 
who collect pornographic materials involving 
minors "commonly ... maintain this material in the privacy of their 
homes." While a magistrate judge may consider an 
expert's opinion in finding probable cause, Inspector Clinton's profile 
was directly contradicted by Loy's statement to the 
undercover agent that he only kept the "stuff that's legal" at his 
residence. The other pornographic materials he kept in a 
rented storage facility because, he explained, "if I keep it out of my 
house then I'm cool."3  In light of Loy's assertion, 
Clinton's experience and expertise, without more, is insufficient to 
establish probable cause.  
_________________________________________________________  
3. Loy also told the agent that both he and his wife were interested in 
child pornography but that he kept the "very young stuff" hidden 
because he was not sure how his wife would feel about it. Based on this 
information, the  
government contends that the magistrate judge could have reasonably 
inferred that Loy only used the storage facility to hide the "very 
young stuff" from his wife and kept the rest of his child pornography at 
home where they could both access it easily. Considering Loy's 
statement that he only keeps his "stuff that's legal" at home, we do not 
find that this is a reasonable inference from the facts contained in 
the affidavit.  
_________________________________________________________  
 
According to the government, even if this Court finds the affidavit 
insufficient to show that Loy stored child pornography 
in his home, we can still find that there was probable cause to believe 
the tape would be found during the search, based 
on the logical inference that Loy would, at least, take it home with him 
to view. As the Tenth Circuit noted, "[i]n making 
the probable cause determination, the issuing magistrate may draw 
reasonable inferences from the material provided in the 
warrant application." Rowland, 145 F.3d at 1205 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 
240). However, we do not find that the 
inference advanced by the government is supported by the facts contained 
in the affidavit. Although it may have been 
reasonable for the magistrate judge to infer that Loy would not view the 
videotape at the storage facility, there was no 
basis for finding that he would view it at his home as opposed to some 
other location. Cf. id. at 1205 (finding the possible 
inference that the defendant would take the tapes of child pornography 
home to view, without any explanation as to why 
he was more likely to view the tapes at home than at some other location, 
insufficient, in and of itself, to establish probable 
cause to believe the tape would be at the defendant's home when the search 
was conducted).  
 
In sum, we do not find that the magistrate judge had a substantial basis 
for believing that the warrant was supported by 
probable cause. Inspector Clinton's conclusory statement that people who 
collect child pornography commonly keep it in 
their homes is insufficient, in light of Loy's own assertion that he kept 
it in a storage facility, to provide the requisite nexus 
between the contraband and Loy's residence. Similarly, there was 
insufficient evidence in the affidavit from which the 
magistrate judge could infer that Loy would bring the videotape home to 
view rather than take it to some other location to 
watch. Cf. Rowland, 145 F.3d at 1204-06 (finding anticipatory warrant to 
search defendant's home not supported by 
probable cause when tapes depicting child pornography were delivered to 
defendant's post office box and there were no 
facts in the affidavit suggesting that he would take the tapes home with 
him rather than take them to some other location to 
view or store); Hendricks, 743 F.2d at 654-56 (holding anticipatory search 
warrant for defendant's home invalid when 
defendant was required to pick up contraband at the airport and there was 
no information indicating that he would take 
the contraband home or otherwise linking defendant's residence with 
illegal activity). We, therefore, find that the warrant 
was not supported by probable cause and as such was invalid.4  
____________________________________________________________________  
4. In addition to the Bath Time video, the warrant authorized the agents 
to search for and seize material depicting children engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct as well as related correspondence, mailing 
lists, and video equipment. While Loy's conversations with the 
agents provided probable cause to believe that he possessed such items, 
the affidavit did not provide probable cause to believe that 
they would be found at Loy's residence. With regard to the other sexually 
explicit materials, the affidavit provided no facts indicating that 
Loy used his residence to view, store or produce child pornography, 
especially in light of Loy's statement that he only kept the "stuff 
that's legal" at home. As for the correspondence and mailing lists, 
although Loy initially gave the undercover agents his home address 
and telephone number, suggesting that he used his residence to solicit 
illicit materials, he subsequently told the agents that he changed 
his telephone number and that they could only contact him through his post 
office box. While Loy offered to give the agents his new 
number, there is no evidence that he ever did. We, therefore, find that 
the affidavit provided insufficient facts linking Loy's residence to 
his illegal activities.  
___________________________________________________________________  
 
C. Good Faith Exception  
 
In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984), the Supreme Court held 
that evidence found to be unsupported by 
probable cause is, nevertheless, admissible when obtained by officers 
acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant 
issued by a detached and neutral magistrate judge. The test for whether 
the good faith exception applies is "whether a 
reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was 
illegal despite the magistrate's authorization." Id. at 
922, n. 23. Outlining the parameters of the exception, the Supreme Court 
recognized that there are circumstances in 
which an officer's reliance on a warrant will not be reasonable and 
therefore suppression will be appropriate. For 
example, the Court noted that the exception will not apply "where the 
warrant is so facially deficient ... that the executing 
officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid" or the affidavit is "so 
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render 
official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable." Id. at 923. 5  
_____________________________________________________________  
5. Our review of the district court's determination that the officers 
relied on the warrant in good faith is plenary.  
United States v. Williams, 3 F.3d 69, 71 n. 2 (3d Cir.1993)  
______________________________________________________________  
 
Appellant relies heavily on United States v. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8 (1st 
Cir.1993), in support of his assertion that the 
good faith exception should not apply here. In Ricciardelli, the court 
refused to apply the exception where the requisite 
nexus between the item to be seized and the place to be searched was not 
established. Id. at 17. The defendant in that 
case ordered a videotape of child pornography from undercover officers who 
then arranged for a controlled delivery of 
the tape to the defendant's home. Prior to the delivery, the officers 
applied for and obtained a search warrant for the 
defendant's residence which was conditioned on his receipt of the package. 
The package was sent in such a way that it 
could not be delivered unless it was signed for by the defendant. Since he 
was not at home when the post office 
attempted to make the delivery, the mail carrier left a note indicating 
that Ricciardelli could pick up the package at the 
post office. That afternoon, the defendant retrieved the tape from the 
post office and returned home with it in his 
possession, at which point the officers, relying on the warrant, searched 
his residence.  
 
The court found the search warrant for the defendant's residence fatally 
defective because it did not require that the 
package containing contraband arrive at the defendant's home before the 
search could be conducted. Id. at 13. Instead, 
the warrant only required that the defendant personally receive the 
package. In other words, the warrant authorized the 
agents to search the defendant's home regardless of where and when he took 
possession of the  
contraband. Although the officers waited until the defendant returned home 
with the tape to execute the search, the court 
refused to apply the good faith exception, finding that a reasonably 
prudent officer should have known that the requisite 
nexus between the item to be seized and the place to be searched had not 
been established. Id. at 16. In reaching its 
decision, the court also noted that it was the officers, not the 
magistrate judge, who were responsible for the defect. The 
officers had failed to inform the magistrate judge that the package had to 
be signed for. As a result, the magistrate judge 
was unaware of the possibility that Ricciardelli would have to pick up the 
package at the post office and, therefore, might 
not be at home when he took possession of the contraband. Id. at 17. Had 
the magistrate judge been fully informed, the 
court stated, the warrant may have been more finely tuned. Id.  
 
While the requisite nexus between the item to be seized and the place to 
be searched is lacking here, as it was in 
Ricciardelli, the warrant in this case was conditioned on more than Loy's 
mere receipt of the package. Loy not only  
had to take possession of the package but he had to return home with it 
before the search could be conducted. 
Moreover, unlike the officers in Ricciardelli, there is no indication in 
the record that the officers here withheld information 
that could have led the magistrate judge to issue a different warrant or 
were in anyway responsible for the warrant's 
defect. We, therefore, reject appellant's assertion that Ricciardelli 
should guide us on this issue.  
 
United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194 (10th Cir.1998), cited by 
appellees, seems to us to be more on point. In 
Rowland, another case similar to this one, the requisite nexus between the 
items to be seized and the place to be  
searched was also lacking. Nevertheless, the court applied the good faith 
exception and refused to suppress the evidence. 
Id. at 1206. The court relied on three factors in reaching its decision. 
First, the court noted that the affidavit, while 
defective, was more than just a "bare bones" affidavit based on conclusory 
statements and lacking factual support. 
Instead, the affidavit included detailed information about the 
investigation into Rowland's criminal activity. Second, the 
court emphasized that the affidavit placed specific conditions on the 
execution of the warrant, rendering it ineffective until 
the defendant returned home with the videotape. In other words, it ensured 
that there would be probable cause at the 
time of the search. Finally, the court found that it was not unreasonable 
for the officers to rely on the magistrate judge's 
authorization because the 10th Circuit had not yet ruled on the 
constitutionality of anticipatory warrants and had not yet 
articulated what conditions would be required for such warrants to be 
valid. Based on these factors, the court concluded 
that the officers could not be expected to know that the magistrate judge 
made an erroneous probable cause 
determination. Id. at 1206-08.  
 
All three of the factors cited by the Tenth Circuit are present before us 
here. As in Rowland, the Clinton affidavit was not 
a "bare bones" document but rather contained detailed facts regarding the 
investigation into Loy's criminal activities, the 
warrant required that Loy return home with the package before the search 
warrant could be executed, guaranteeing that 
there would be probable cause when the search was conducted, and this 
Circuit had not yet decided the constitutionality 
of anticipatory warrants at the time the warrant was issued. Based on the 
Rowland analysis, we do not find that the 
warrant was so facially deficient or lacking in indica of probable cause 
that a reasonably well trained officer would have 
known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate judge's 
authorization. As a result, we find that the good faith 
exception applies and uphold the district court's denial of defendant's 
motion to suppress.  
 
II. Particularity Requirement  
 
Appellant argues that the portion of the warrant which sought 
"[p]hotographs, drawings, magazines or other visual media 
to include photographic slides, videotapes or literature depicting 
children under the age of 18 years engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct as defined in Title 18, U.S.Code, Section 2256," was 
impermissibly broad since it failed to describe the 
items to be seized with sufficient particularity. Specifically, Loy 
contends that the phrase "children under the age of 18" 
could lead to the seizure of material protected by the First Amendment by 
executing officers unable to distinguish between 
illegal child pornography and legal adult pornography. We review the 
magistrate judge's determination for plain error. 
United States v. Martinez- Zayas, 857 F.2d 122, 134 (3d Cir.1988); United 
States v. Bey, 736 F.2d 891, 895 (3d 
Cir.1984). 6  
______________________________________________________  
6. Appellant concedes that he did not raise this argument in his motion to 
suppress but argues that since particularity is intertwined with 
probable cause, the issue was nevertheless preserved. We disagree. 
Appellant cites no support, nor have we found any, for the 
proposition that preserving the right to appeal an adverse probable cause 
determination simultaneously safeguards appellant's right to 
appeal on the basis of particularity. However, issues that are not 
preserved may nevertheless be reviewed for "plain error." United States 
v. Riddick, 156 F.3d 505, 509 (3d Cir.1998)(citing Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b))  
______________________________________________________  
 
We find that the warrant describes the materials to be sought with all the 
particularity required by the Constitution. Courts 
faced with similar warrants have consistently found that such language is 
not overbroad. For example, in United States v. 
Hurt, 795 F.2d 765, 772 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816, 108 S.Ct. 
69, 98 L.Ed.2d 33 (1987), the Ninth Circuit 
held that a warrant was sufficiently particular where it authorized the 
search for materials "depicting minors (that is, 
persons under the age of 16) engaged in sexually explicit conduct." 
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit upheld a search warrant 
where it referred to the items to be seized as "child pornography." United 
States v. Layne, 43 F.3d 127, 132 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1077, 115 S.Ct. 1722, 131 L.Ed.2d 580 (1995).  
 
While we recognize that in some cases it may be difficult to distinguish 
between adults and children, we agree with the 
Eighth Circuit that, "[t]he fact that some adults look like minors and 
some minors look like adults does not mean a warrant 
is overbroad. Most minors look like minors and most adults look like 
adults, and most of the time most law enforcement 
officers can tell the difference." United States v. Koelling, 992 F.2d 
817, 822 (8th Cir.1993). In sum, we find that the 
phrase "children under the age of 18" is not so uncertain as to make a 
warrant defective, even though it might lead to the 
mistaken seizure of adult pornography.  
 
III. The Conditions of Supervised Release  
 
As this court has recognized, a sentencing judge has wide discretion in 
imposing conditions of supervised release. United 
States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 127 (3d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 
(U.S. June 14, 1999)(No. 98- 9838). However, 
the court's discretion is not without limitations. An order may be a 
condition of supervised release only to the extent that it: 
(1) reasonably relates to the factors set forth in the statute containing 
the sentencing guidelines and (2) involves no greater 
deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set 
forth in the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1) & (2). 
This statutory scheme provides for consideration of: (1) the nature and 
circumstance of the offense and the history and 
characteristics of the defendant and (2) the need for the sentence imposed 
to deter future criminal conduct, protect the 
public, and provide the defendant with necessary training, medical care, 
or other correctional treatment. 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a)(1) & (2). 7  
____________________________________________________________  
7. A district court's findings regarding the imposition of supervised 
release are reviewed for abuse of discretion.  
Crandon, 173 F.3d at 127.  
____________________________________________________________  
 
A. Testing and Treatment for Drug Abuse 8  
 
Appellant argues that since there was no indication in the pre-sentence 
report or elsewhere in the record that he ever used 
drugs, this condition is not reasonably related to any statutory goal and 
involves a greater deprivation of liberty than 
required. While it is true that there is nothing in the pre- sentence 
report, or elsewhere in the record indicating that Loy 
engaged in illegal drug use, submission to drug testing is a mandatory 
condition of supervised release, regardless of the 
defendant's drug history. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)(5). Loy, nevertheless, 
argues that the court abused its discretion in 
requiring drug testing since the statute provides that the condition "may 
be ameliorated or suspended by the court for any 
individual defendant if the defendant's pre-sentence report or other 
reliable sentencing information indicates a low risk of 
future substance abuse by the defendant." Id. What Loy overlooks in making 
this argument is that the relevant provision 
merely suggests that the court "may" ameliorate or suspend the condition 
where there is low risk of future substance 
abuse. It does not state that the court is required to do so. 
Consequently, the district court cannot be said to have abused 
its discretion in imposing drug testing as a condition of Loy's supervised 
release, despite his lack of prior drug use.  
__________________________________________________________  
8. We address the alcohol and drug components of this condition separately 
since the court is required by statute to  
impose drug testing as a condition of supervised release, while the 
imposition of alcohol testing and treatment is  
discretionary. See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)(5).  
__________________________________________________________  
 
As for the drug treatment component of the condition, the district court 
only directed that Loy submit to drug treatment "if 
necessary" and "as directed by the probation officer." Whether Loy will 
have to enroll in drug treatment program, then, 
depends on whether he tests positive for drug use. If the tests reveal no 
evidence of drug use, then treatment would not be 
"necessary" and as such, could not be required. Consequently, we do not 
find that the district court abused its discretion 
by imposing provisional drug treatment as a condition of supervised 
release.  
 
B. Conditions Requiring Alcohol Testing and Treatment, Prohibiting 
Unsupervised Contact with Minors, and 
Forbidding Appellant from Possessing Pornography  
 
Loy also argues that the district court abused its discretion by ordering 
him to submit to alcohol testing and treatment, 
prohibiting him from having unsupervised contact with minors, and 
forbidding him from possessing pornography of any 
kind. Generally, appellant argues that these conditions are not reasonably 
related to any of the statutory goals and involve 
a greater deprivation of liberty than required.  
 
The court imposed these special conditions without making any factual 
findings relating to them or providing any reasons 
in support of them. While the district court has broad discretion in 
fashioning conditions of supervised release, the 
sentencing judge is required by statute to state the reasons in open court 
for imposing a particular sentence. See 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(c). By explaining the reasons behind the sentence, the court 
ensures that appellate review does not 
"flounder in the zone of speculation." United States v. Edgin, 92 F.2d 
1044, 1049 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 
U.S.1069 (1997)(quotations omitted). Since we do not know why the district 
court imposed these conditions, we cannot 
properly review Loy's abuse of discretion claim. Accordingly, we remand 
the case and direct the district court to state its 
reasons for requiring alcohol testing and treatment, prohibiting 
unsupervised contact with minors, and forbidding Loy from 
possessing pornography of any kind. In remanding, we remind the court that 
the conditions of supervised release must be 
reasonably related to the goals of deterrence, protection of the public 
and rehabilitation of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 
3583(d)(1) & § 3553(a)(2). Moreover, we caution that any condition 
implicating the deprivation of liberty can be no 




For the reasons stated above, we uphold the district court's denial of 
defendant's motion to suppress. Although the search 
warrant for Loy's residence lacked probable cause, the officers reasonably 
relied on the warrant in good faith. Moreover, 
we find that the warrant described the items to be seized with sufficient 
particularity. We remand the case to the district 
court for further findings relating to the conditions of supervised 
release.  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
